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Abstract
Ontology is a knowledge about world as a whole. Union of ontology and science put some 
limitations on ontology, that are caused by need to co-ordinate language of science with language 
of ontology. Main characteristic features of science are logic and mathematics. Union of ontology 
and science could be successful only if ontology will have the same features. !ese requirements 
meets relative ontology based on a assumption that being is possible only through act of inequality, 
and non-being – through act of equality. Examining of inequality structure leads us to a need of 
considering in being act of equality as well. As a result we should refuse of considering problems 
of Being—Non-Being separately and proceed to united problem of Being—Non-Being. Inequality 
can be represented by mathematical subtraction. !at allows to substantiate ontologically basic 
mathematical concepts: concepts of set and number. Mathematics become a part of ontology. 
Inequality is an idea. Equality is a matter. Being is a unity of matter and idea. Change of being can 
be ful"lled in two ways – material and ideal. Relation between both ways of change gives us three 
basic kind of being: somatic, anthropological and theological. In somatic being change is realized 
by means of material way. In anthropological being – both material and ideal ways are equally 
available. !eological being uses ideal way of change. Development of world proceeds from somatic 
–  through anthropological – to theological one.
Keywords: ontology, relative ontology, categories, being. 
Resumen. Onotlogía relativa y ciencia.
La ontología es un conocimiento acerca del mundo como un todo. La unión de la ontología y de 
la ciencia pone algunas limitaciones a la ontología, que son causadas por la necesidad de coordinar 
el lenguaje de la ciencia con el lenguaje de la ontología. Las principales características de la ciencia 
son la lógica y las matemáticas. La unión de la ontología y de la ciencia podría tener éxito sólo si la 
ontología tuviese las mismas características. Estas condiciones se dan en una ontología relativa basada 
en la idea de que “estar” solo es posible a través de un acto de desigualdad, y “no-ser” a través de un 
acto de igualdad. El examen de la estructura de la desigualdad nos lleva a la necesidad de considerar 
también el ser acto de la igualdad. Como resultado de ello debemos rechazar la consideración de los 
problemas de ser-no-ser separado y proceder al problema de la unión de ser-no-ser. La desigualdad 
se puede representar por resta matemática. Esto permite fundamentar los conceptos matemáticos 
básicos: ontológicamente conceptos de conjunto y el número. 
Palabras clave: ontología, ontología relativa, categorías, ser.
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When we speak about ontology of science, it turns out that term ontology is less de!nite 
than term science. In XX cent. term ontology turned out to be as di"used as term philosophy. 
In the article by ontology we mean a knowledge about world as a whole. A starting point 
of such knowledge is the problem of Being of beings. While each positive science is a 
knowledge concerning some region of the universe, ontology is a knowledge about world 
as a whole. #at is the main di"erence between ontology and science.
Yet speaking of inde!niteness in understanding of ontology we primarily mean its 
inde!niteness in content. #roughout the history of philosophy various doctrines of 
the world as a whole were elaborated. In this connection there arise a problem of some 
ontological doctrine selection. 
In science such selection is made upon the basis of experiment, yet in ontology this is 
impossible.
Selection of ontology may be realized  not only by means of veri!cation principle but 
on basis of problem of correspondence between content of ontology and its primordial 
functions as well. In order to stay within frameworks of Ontology and Science theme we 
should look for ontology co-ordinated with science. In this situation it is science that set 
requirements ontology must conform.
#e main requirement is derived from aim set at the union of ontology and science. In 
the perspective of science, ontology due to its scale and consistency may exercise following 
functions: !rst, integrate di"erent positive sciences; second, within frameworks of ontology 
also due to its scale, it is possible to reconsider both foundations of scienti!c knowledge 
as a whole and foundations of some speci!c sciences. So ontology should conform the 
assigned task.
In this perspective the common language !eld of ontology and science gets an enormous 
importance. So the next requirement to ontology concerns the form of ontology language. 
As it is known the basis of syntax in scienti!c language is constituted by formal logic. 
We may put more exacting requirements to language in connection with a well-known 
statement that each knowledge may be called science to an extent it may be put on a 
language of mathematics. Rephrasing this statement we may put the following requirement 
to ontology that works for a union with science. Such a union will be e"ective only to the 
extent the ontology is connected with mathematics.
Suggested requirements to ontology in the perspective of science do not mean 
submission of former to science. #e substance of the suggested requirements may and 
even should be reconsidered by ontology itself. #at is why eventually these requirements 
turn to be internal ones of ontology within itself. As for science, ontology is merely an 
initiator of  these requirements.
For instance, the requirement concerning logical form of ontology language means 
that foundations of logic should be reconsidered within ontology. #e urgency of such 
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study is caused by the fact that modern logic is incapable to cope with vital needs of 
language formalization. 
!e result of considering the foundations of logic do not suppose that logic itself 
remain unchanged. It may change radically. Possible innovations in logic would be a 
contribution we may expect from the union of ontology and science. In such situation 
instead of requirement for adaptation of logic of ontology to logic of science requirement 
of mutual coordination between logic of ontology and one of science is proposed.
!e same situation may be expected from the requirement of mathematicity of 
ontology. We should reconsider the foundations of mathematics within ontology. !is 
problem became urgent as a separate theme – !e Ontology of Mathematics. Last time 
such a consideration was made in the end of XIX – beginning of XX cent. Heavy growth 
of mathematics during last century demands a new reconsideration of the foundations of 
mathematics.
As an indication of crisis in mathematics may be considered its over-compli"cation 
leading not only to the gap between mathematics and a task of di#erent regions of the 
world description, but also to insurmountable di#erentiation within mathematics itself. 
Mathematicians working with some speci"c mathematical discipline can hardly understand 
colleagues working in neighboring speci"c discipline.
Compli"cation in mathematics is accompanied with very modest achievements in 
re$ecting some substantial aspects of non-physical regions of the world. Mathematics 
here study only problems that have principal similarity to some physical issues. Possibly, 
comli"cation of mathematics is a result of some speci"c statements steal in its foundations 
that prevent from successful work in the regions of the world where such speci"c character 
is absent. Revision of the foundations of mathematics will allow to detect such non-
legitimate foundations.
We suppose to realize theme !e Ontology and Mathematics in some other way 
compared with proposed by Alain Badiou. If Badiou uses modern mathematical apparatus 
for explication of statements of ontology – i.e. goes from mathematics to ontology – we 
propose quite opposite relations between ontology and mathematics. We have not any 
grounds to entrust to ontological  foundations on which modern mathematics based. We 
propose a way from ontology to mathematics.
So requirement of mathematicity of ontology, as well as in case of logic, is a requirement 
of mutual correspondence between mathematical foundations, elaborated within 
ontology, and foundations of contemporary mathematics. !at is why the requirement 
of mathematicity of ontology is mutually co-ordinated one directed both to science and 
ontology as well.
Mentioned above requirements are valid for relative ontology based on a statement 
that Being of beings is possible as Being of speci"c beings. And vice verse if Being is 
not speci"ed, then it is actually not present (Non-Being). Indeed, every speci"c being we 
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interact has some de!niteness. For instance, we see every speci!c rose having its color (for 
instance, red). "at is why we consider the seen rose to be present, i.e. assign it a status 
of being. And vice verse, it is impossible to see rose that has no color at all, i.e. has no 
distinctive features. Hence it is clear that we consider unseen rose to be non-present, i.e. 
assign it status of non-being. "e same think-train is valid not only for sense perception, 
but for perception of mind as well. When someone tries to explain a new concept to 
someone else, he makes it by indicating speci!c features of the concept initially unknown 
to the later. Speci!c features of concept are nothing else but its de!niteness. "e statement 
of Being as de!niteness is valid not only for interaction of human with any other being, 
but in case of his absence as well. So a rose interacts with a wind that has some distinctive 
features such as its velocity, temperature, humidity, chemistry, and atmospheric pressure. 
"at is why the only wind presented (Being) for the rose is the one having some distinctive 
features. And vice verse, the wind having no distinctive feature is not presented (Non-
Being).
Next statement of relative ontology is that any de!niteness is possible only through an 
act of distinction. "at is why Being is also possible only as an act of distinction. And vice 
verse, Non-Being is realized though non-distinction, i.e. equality (identity). Red rose exists 
(Being) only because it di#ers for instance from green grass growing around bush of roses, 
or di#ers from blue color of wall papers in the room where it is located. And vice verse, red 
rose does not exist (Non-Being) on a background of just the same red color. Distinction 
as a necessary criterion of Being also have a place in the region of thought. For instance, 
concept of “red” exist (Being) only if there is at least any other concept from which it may 
be distinct, for example, concept of “green” or “blue”.
Any distinction of the being is a result of its comparison with other being. Hence, Being 
of one being always suppose Being of another one. "at means that problem of Being of 
beings is always a problem of co-existance (co-being) of several beings, i.e. problem of 
Being is always a problem of co-being. "e result of situation is impossibility of Being for 
any absolutely separate being. Following our example, the necessary condition of red rose 
existence (Being) is the existence (Being) of, for instance, green grass or blue wall-papers. 
Hence if there do not exist (Non-Being) beings with a color distinct from red, then there 
do not exist (Non-Being) red rose itself. "e same is valid for thinking. If there do not exist 
(Non-Being) other concept of the color except red, there do not exist (Non-Being) concept 
of red itself.
In act of comparison there always supposed a basis of comparison (basis of relation), 
that is a common feature for members of the act. Analyzing being of red rose we take 
into consideration its property of color. "at is why any conclusion made is valid only in 
relation to its color. Besides property of color red rose also has such property as a form of 
a $ower. On this basis we may di#er it from, for instance, camomile. In this case its status 
of existence (Being) is provided by the form, not by the color.
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!e basis of relation is a common feature for both related beings (carriers of relation). 
Yet such commonness is nothing else but a non-distinction, i.e. equality (identity), that 
is Non-Being. Hence we proceed from distinction as Being to non-distinction as Non-
Being. !is situation compels us to refuse considering Being and Non-Being as a separate 
problems and to proceed to a united problem of Being—Non-Being. As far as we marked 
out non-distinction as a separate concept – a basis for relation, we need a speci"c concept 
for distinction, that is “a result of relation”. By relation itself we understand a totality 
within which takes place act of distinction.
!e most proper form for act of comparison (distinction) explication is a relative 
proposition. Per se relative proposition is a logical form for expressing main ontological 
principle of Being—Non-Being. In such a case logic based on relative propositions becomes 
not only a notion about forms of thinking, but a notion of Being—Non-Being as well, i.e. 
logic becomes a part of ontology. In this logic every attributive proposition is a speci"c 
form of relative proposition, i.e. formal logic (Aristotelian) in whole could be explicated as 
logic of relations. Now let us demonstrate this statement.
Traditional form to put a relative proposition is the following:
aRb.  (1)
Yet here a basis of relation is not taken into consideration. We can easily correct the 
obstacle, if we put relative proposition in following way:
mƠ mƠơ mơ. (2),
where besides carriers of relation (Ơ, ơ), a basis of relation (m) is taken into consideration 
as well. !is relative proposition should be taken as an expression for distinction of terms 
of proposition by basis. If all non-distinctness is collected in basis of relation, then in «mƠơ» 
(result of relation) we have momentum of distinction of proposition terms, i.e.  «mƠơ» is 
the point to di$er one proposition from another.
E$orts of logicians to expand facilities of reasoning with relative propositions were 
not, on my opinion, successful enough. Seemingly, it was connected with representation 
of relative proposition in a form “aRb”. Ontological substantiation of relative proposition 
by means of distinction helps us to introduce other form for relative proposition. We 
may represent distinction as a subtraction. Adopting this operation from mathematics 
and "lling it with ontological and logical meaning, we may put relative proposition in the 
following form:
mƠ – mơ = 6mƠơ.  (3)
Now let me demonstrate that any attributive proposition:
«S – P»  (4)
is a cancellation of set of relative propositions
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«mƠ – mơ1 = 6mƠ(ơ1)», 
«mƠ – mơ2 = 6mƠ(ơ2)», 
«mƠ – mơ3 = 6mƠ(ơ3)»,       (5)
……………………. 
«mƠ – mơn = mƠ(ơn)»
with a same result of relation
6mƠơ = 6mƠ(ơ1) = 6mƠ(ơ2) = 6mƠ(ơ3) = … = 6mƠ(ơn),  (6)
where remains the same term of each relative proposition and all others are omitted. 
Here “P” from (4) is the same «mƠơ» as in (6), and “S” from (4) – the same as “a” in (5). For 
example, suppose following relations given:
“a coin (a) by re"ected light (s – shining) 
shines more (6sƠ(ơ1)) than a book cover (b1)”,
“a coin (a) on re"ected light (s) shines more
(6sƠ(ơ2)), than a "owerpot (b2)”,
“a coin (a) by re"ected light (s) shines more
(6sƠ(ơ3)), than a granite (b3)”.
In attributive form this totality is presented as:
“a coin (a) shines more 6sƠơ = 6sƠ(ơ1) = 
6sƠ(ơ2) = 6sƠ(ơ3)) by re"ected light (s)”.
Let a coin be a member of some other set of relations. For example,
“a coin (a) in case of mechanical shock (m – malleable )
more easily change its form (6mƠ(ơ1)), than a book cover (b1)”,
“a coin (a) in case of mechanical shock (m) more easily 
change its form (6mƠ(ơ2)), than a "owerpot (b2)”,
“a coin (a) in case of mechanical shock (m) more easily 
change its form (6mƠ(ơ3)), than a granite (b3)”.
In attributive form this set is presented as follows:
“ a coin (a) can be easily processed (6mƠơ = 6mƠ(ơ1) = 6mƠ(ơ2) 
= 6mƠ(ơ3)) by means of mechanical shock (m)”.
Let there exist other set with a participation of a coin (a) -- separately for such bases as 
compactness (c – compact), heat capacity (h – heat), fusion temperature (t --  temperature). 
In attributive form they are presented as follows:
“a coin is more compact”,
“a coin has a greater heat capacity”,
“a coin has a greater fusion temperature”.
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Imagine ourselves that derived predicates, obtained as a result of relation together with its 
basis (shining – «6sƠơ», easy mechanical processing by means of shock – «6mƠơ», higher 
compactness – «6cƠơ», greater heat capacity – «6hƠơ», higher fusion temperature – «6tƠơ») 
indicate some totality that becomes denotatum for a concept of metal – (R). Here “R” is 
a set of elements «6sƠơ», «6mƠơ», «6cƠơ», «6hƠơ», «6tƠơ» and on elements «s», «m», «c», «h», 
«t» set «C» is formed. !en whole set of derived attributive propositions may be represented 
by one attributive proposition:
“a coin (a) is a metal (R)”,
that has the same form as (1).
In relative ontology expressing of relative proposition as a subtraction can be used for 
representation of Being and Non-Being. Indeed, if the result of subtraction is not equal 
to zero (mƠ – mơ = 6mƠơ ≠ 0), it means di$erentiation between terms of subtraction, i.e. 
such a result is a mathematical expression for Being «mƠ» in relation to «mơ». If the result 
is equal to zero (mƠ – mơ = 6mƠơ = 0), it means absence of di$erentiation between terms 
of comparison and hence this is a mathematical expression for Non-Being principle «mƠ» 
in relation to «mơ». In logic reduction of every proposition to subtraction operation allows 
reduction of every reasoning to subtraction operation. For all that we speak not about 
mathematical logic, but about representation of whole logic in whole as mathematics. 
!e record of a relation proposition in the form (3) allows to make logical and due to 
this an ontological substantiation of mathematical concept of relative set. Let for one term 
in relation (3) (for instance, for mƠ) there exist other relations with some other terms on 
the same basis, i.e.:
mƠ – ma = 6mƠa; 
mƠ – mb = 6mƠƣ;  (7)
mƠ – m¡ = 6mƠƤ. 
Suppose that in all results of these relations included terms are distinct. If we look aside 
speci%c content of the results and %x only the fact of distinction (denoted passim as «≠»), 
these results are indistinguishable. So all relations (7) have the following form:
mƠ ≠ ma; 
mƠ ≠ mb;            (8)
mƠ ≠ m¡. 
Condition (8) de%ne a set of beings distinct from each other on the same basis. !is 
condition is a description of relative set concept, where only the fact of distinction is stated. 
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!e concept of relative set is not the same thing as in the set theory. For instance, compared 
with traditional set theory in relative set concept signi"cance of empty set is lower, in"nite 
sets are excluded. Advantage of relative set application is not only due to logical, but to 
ontological substantiation as well, whereas traditional set theory is substantiated only 
logically.
Expression of relative proposition in the form (3) allows logical and due to this 
ontological substantiation of mathematical concept of relative elementary number. Let 
there are following relations:
mb – ma = 6mba; 
ms – mb = 6msb;                  (9)
md – ms = 6mds;  
me – md = 6med.  
Common feature of all of relations (9) is that some of character belonging to one term 
of relation do not belong to another. !en all results of relations (9) are just the same, i.e.:
6mba = 6msb = 6mds = 6med = r. (10)
!en (9) can be put in following:
mb – ma = r; 
ms – mb = r;                         (11)
md – ms = r; 
me – md = r.  
In each particular relation basis is realized speci"cally, but all such speci"city is represented 
in carriers of relation. Concept of basis include only features common to all particular 
objects in (9). !en all speci"cs of objects in (9) represented in corresponding carriers of 
relations (a, b, s, d, e – carriers of relation correspondingly for «a», «b», «c», «d», «e»). As 
an example of such relations can be mentioned relations of vertical extension of segments.
From (11) we can easily get relation of «b», «c», «d», «e» with «a»:
mb – ma = r; 
ms – ma = r + r;            (12)
md – ma = r + r + r; 
me – ma = r + r + r + r. 
Each of the results of these relations is a de"nition for relative elementary numbers:
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r – «1»; 
r + r – «2»;                    (13)
r + r + r – «3»; 
r + r + r + r – «4». 
Negative values of these numbers signify correspondingly:
«– r» – «– 1» (less); 
«– r – r» – «– 2»;           
«– r – r – r» – «– 3»; 
«– r – r – r – r» – «– 4».
Assume (12) with a consideration (13):
mb – ma = 1; 
ms – ma = 2;     (14)
md – ma = 3; 
me – ma = 4. 
In view of universal character (for 12), «ma»  (denoted as “etalon”) can be omitted.
Let for some reasons (ontological or pragmatic) we have instead of (3)
mƠ = mơ.           (15)
It means indiscrimination of «mƠ» Ȝ «mơ» in (3). "e meaning of indiscrimination is in its 
interchangeability on basis «m». Such relations can be expressed by means of relative zero 
concept:
mƠ – mơ = 0.      (16)
As it was mentioned above, indiscrimination ontologically signi#es Non-Being of one 
being in its relation to another one, i.e. Non-Being is relative. Only if there would be no 
other being distinct from the former, such Non-Being would be absolute.
Relative number concept is not the same thing as concept of number in traditional 
mathematics. "is is caused primarily by the fact that relative numbers are connected 
with a relation basis (m) out of which they were derived. Whereas numbers in traditional 
mathematics in this perspective are totally “deprived of individuality”. To some extent this 
position is a return to J.Mill’s point of view and a refutation of its criticism by G.Frege. It is 
well-known that afterwards prevailed exactly the position of G.Frege. Reference to J.Mill’s 
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position is urgent not in itself but because of new perspectives opened in connection with 
logic of relations, based on presenting relative proposition according to form (3). More 
than that, such a presenting allows to reconcile both positions. For that purpose we must 
take a set with in!nite number of elements where the following rule is valid: for each result 
of relation between two terms taken at random, there always exist such a third term, that 
di"ers from result of relation between two formers in such a way, that this result posses 
some features that third term does not posses. In this case relative elementary numbers 
transform into in!nite number series.
Operating with relative numbers is to a great extent determined by basis of relation and 
its carriers. #eir common and invariable feature is ontological and logical substantiation 
demonstrated above. For each relative set operations with relative numbers may be 
di"erent. Yet the lack of universality turns out to be an advantage because of avoiding a 
lot of paradoxes and nonsense connected with numbers in traditional mathematics. For 
instance, in school sum on three diggers who dig two pits, the task is: calculate how much 
diggers are needed to dig a one pit? #e answer in traditional mathematics is – one and a 
half. Yet it is nonsense, there cannot be one and a half man. In relative mathematics such 
situation is impossible because there is no concept of in!nitely large or in!nitely small. In 
that perspective relative mathematics always has a quantum character – in full accordance 
with human experience. Indeed, accurate calculations are often excessive for in practical 
needs we are always limited with practical error that have a quantum character.
Mathematical representation of relative ontology gives it a close relation to sciences, 
that use a mathematical language. In that case mathematics turns out to be the only 
method of presentation for statements of ontology and science. As an example of relative 
ontology e$cacy in informational sciences can be mentioned exact formulating of the 
information concept as a result of relation. Besides, mathematical part of relative ontology 
allows to formalize such an important concept as meaning (content) of information that 
in turn makes possible some sort of ordering in various IT databases. #is makes easier use 
of all aspects of information, for instance, a transition from seek of information to based 
on meaning calculations.
De!niteness as a result of distinction (result of relation) is nothing else than an ideal 
(eidos, image, idea, form, quantity). Basis of distinction (basis of relation) together with 
carrier of relation is a material (matter, property, quality). As far as the necessary condition 
of Being—Non-Being is both discrimination and indiscrimination, being is a unity of 
both sides, unity of material and ideal.
Hitherto we examine only one method of description of distinction, i.e. distinction as 
relation. In this method static side of being is presented. Its dynamic side is presented in 
another way of distinction’s description, i.e. distinction as interaction. At present proximity 
of meaning of interaction and relation concepts is obvious. #ere is one common feature: 
each of them presuppose in its content presence of at least two members. Interaction is 
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often called a relation of cause and e!ect. "at is why while constituting content of category 
of interaction it makes sense to base on the same postulate as in case of substantiation of 
relation as a necessary condition of Being.
Discrepancy of categories’ relation and interaction content starts from such structural 
concept as carrier of relation. Relation category supposes that carriers of relation (Ơ, ơ) are 
discriminated (in other relations) from each other. Yet we may assume a variant when bases 
are equal. It means that terms of distinction are similar in each feature except dimension, 
and that is why may be considered (in relative meaning, not absolute) to be the same being 
undergoing some changes (indeed, just these changes do not allow existence of absolutely 
singular being), i.e. is di!erentiated from itself. In everyday speech we may say “from itself ” 
implying that “it” and “self ” are just the same. In relative ontology such expressions have 
no sense. So, distinction where carriers of relation coincide, is called change. Seemingly, we 
may put it in symbolic form as following:
mƠ – mƠ = 6mƠƠ = 6mƠ ≠ 0, (17)
where 6mƠ — a short notation for 6mƠƠ — change of “a”, in whose content carrier 
“Ơ” is included. "e problem of such expression is, that if «mƠ», standing to the left from 
symbol «–», and «mƠ», standing to the right – are just the same, we must accept 
6mƠ = 0 (18),
that means absence of distinction. In order to avoid such di$culties we will use slightly 
di!erent form of notation for change, using upper index:
mƠe – mƠb = 6mƠƠ = 6mƠ ≠ 0, (19)
where mƠb — initial state of being, who’s carrier is «Ơ», on basis «m»; mƠe — %nal state 
of being, who’s carrier is «Ơ», on basis «m».
 At the same time we must take into consideration that distinction between “initial 
state” and “%nal state” of some thing is not a determining momentum for distinction (as 
a result of relation) for a given change (6mƠ). It is impossible to specify logically genus for 
distinction, i.e. in any de%nition distinction there will always be a determining concept. In 
given case (19) distinction is a determining concept for determinate terms.
 Here it is just distinction that determinates what is “%nal state” and what is “initial 
state” for any thing, and not vice verse, as it may seem due to language structures. In such 
situation it is always necessary to remember that language of ontology is based mainly on 
everyday language, yet later is not %t to exact representing of non-everyday situations. In 
everyday reality we are convinced that always can specify a conditionality of any appearance. 
"erefore language cannot express situation of total “unconditionality”, except by means 
of additional stipulations. In everyday speech it is possible to say: “a distinction from one 
another”. Yet by saying “one” and “another” we have already introduced a distinction. 
In everyday reality we suppose that there are some “one” and “another” as such, we can 
discriminate. It is all clear on a level of everyday experience. Yet situation becomes more 
di$cult if we assume that there are no any “one” or “another”, but distinction is a necessary 
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condition of their existence. !ese predicaments are the language predicaments built as a 
conceptual one. !en for appropriate expression of relation situations we need a language 
based on relative propositions.
 As far as we have now two ways of distinction, we need to di"erentiate them 
terminologically. For this purpose we will use terms “static distinction” and “dynamic 
distinction”. Static distinction is such a distinction, that appears in situation of carriers’ of 
relation distinction in case of it (distinction) realization on another relation(s). Dynamic 
distinction (or “changing”) is such a distinction, that appears in situation of carriers’ of 
relation non-distinction. Accordingly (in case we talk just of dynamic relation or just of 
static relation) there modify structural elements’ of relation designations; for instance, in 
case of dynamic relation (or changing) instead of term “carrier of relation” should be used 
term “carrier of dynamic relation” (or “carrier of changing”) and etc. 
 For example, to clarify structural elements of interaction, let us take situation of 
two changes. First one is a change of being as a consequence, that is a speci#c dynamic 
relation. Let’s designate its structural elements as following: carrier of a consequence —   ơ», 
basis of a consequence —  «m», a result of consequence —  «6mơ». At that corresponding 
being (we will call it “being-consequence” and designate as “b”) proceeds from its initial 
state «mơb» to its #nal state «mơe», i.e. consequence may be put as 
mơe – mơb = 6mơ ≠ 0. (20)
 For instance, in process of punching consequence is a change of geometrical 
form of billet. !en being-consequence “b”, who’s change is a consequence, may be, for 
example, aluminum plate, out of which in a process of punching a spoon is made. In 
that case carrier of consequence has all characters of aluminum plate of billet except its 
geometrical form, that is a basis of consequence “m”. initial state of being “b” is a plain 
form of aluminum plate «mơb», and its #nal state is a bent surface of the same aluminum 
plate after punching  «mơe». Discrimination of these states gives us a geometrical form that 
is an image of consequence «6mơ», that we call a form of a spoon.
 Second is a change of being, a cause, that is a speci#c dynamic relation. Let us 
designate its structural elements as following: carrier of a cause —  «Ơ», basis of a cause 
—  «f», result of a cause —  «6fƠ». At that corresponding being --  designate it as “a” – pass 
from its initial state  «fƠb» to its #nal state «fƠe», i.e. a cause can be put as following:
fƠe – fƠb = 6fƠ ≠ 0. (21)
 In our example with punching a cause is a change of a model-punch location, that 
is a being-cause “a”, and basis of cause “f ” may be, for instance, a height of a model-punch 
location  over a billet. !en all other features of a model-punch will belong to a carrier 
of a cause. Let the location of a model-punch over a billet equal to h1 corresponds to 
initial state of being-cause («fƠb») and to its #nal state («fƠe»,) – location h2. !e di"erence 
between these two locations is a result of cause («6fƠ»).
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 Presence of two changes in interaction – change as a cause (6fƠ) and change as a 
consequence (6mơ) – realized on di!erent bases (m Ȝ f ), allows to interpret interaction as 
a combination of these changes:
 6fƠ A 6ȥơ. (22)
 Here interaction is designated by distinction put as a subtraction. In my opinion 
such form of ontological category of interaction’s presentation promotes to a great extent 
a coordination of language of ontology with one of mathematics. 
 A change of being is a change in its de"niteness. Due to double-sidedness of being, 
theoretically speaking three ways of changing are possible. First way is a material one 
when a cause of change is situated within a sphere of being undergoing material changing. 
For instance, a cause of change in de"niteness of physical body volume is a change of its 
temperature. A cause of given material body change lies within the sphere of other material 
body, and a cause of that body change in turn lies within a sphere of third body and so on. 
Ontological school that stands for only material way of change in philosophy is called a 
materialism.
 Second way – an ideal one, when a cause of given being’s change lies directly (i.e. 
without a material mediation) within ideal sphere of another changing being. Essence of 
this way of change is that de"niteness of one being tends (in physics such tendention is 
designated by concepts of power, intensity, energy) to change (on the same basis of relation) 
another being’s de"niteness. Simple example of that kind is an act of thinking accompanied 
by human activity: one day there appeared an intension (a de"niteness of second being – a 
cause) to move a furniture in a room (location of furniture is a de"niteness of "rst being). 
Realizing this forethought, we change a de"niteness of "rst being. Surely, given change was 
realized by means of material mediation, but in such situation it is always a consequence, 
not a cause. #ere are some ontological doctrines expanding that sort of change on Being 
as a whole. An extreme example of such casual chain is a Divine Creation of the world, 
conceived as absolute ideal. #is ontological school assuming only ideal way of changing, 
is conventionally called in philosophy an idealism.
 Ideological advantage of materialism is due to its well-accordance with a lot of 
phenomena in a "eld of natural sciences. Yet science can describe only a part of all variety 
of beings. Weakness of materialism is revealed in considering of beings possessing thinking. 
Situation of idealism is quite the opposite: it is successful and convincing in dealing with 
a region of the world connected with thinking and looses in region described by natural 
sciences. Such a regional opposition can be explained by the fact that none of these 
doctrines is ontologically universal, but is a sort of particular, regional knowledge. Our 
interpretation of materialism-idealism relation not only decreases mutual tension between 
them but shows the need for their co-completing as well. 
 #is task is realized in the third way of change of being: the same being undergoes 
both kinds of change – material and ideal as well. Just various extent of inherited features 
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allows us to proceed from materialism-idealism opposition to their co-completing. !is 
can be made due to the fact that relation between material and ideal ways of changing 
reveals three main kinds of being. First one – somatic being, for which change is ful"lled 
primarily in material way. !at kind of being is described by natural sciences. Second 
kind – anthropological being, for which both material and ideal ways of changing are 
equally available. !at is a kind of being endowed with thinking. Human is only a one 
sort of such anthropological being. !ird kind – theological one, that uses primarily ideal 
way of changing. Beside these three kinds of being there are some others, having various 
degree of material/ideal ratio. Development of the world proceeds from somatic – through 
anthropological – to theological being.
 !us relative ontology is based on clear and obvious statement of being as a 
distinction. Such approach allows to represent being as a material-ideal unity, give it an 
onto-mathematical substantiation and opens new possibilities for a union of ontology 
and science. Dualistic substance of being surmounts materialism/idealism opposition 
due to a need of their co-completing demonstration. As a result of such approach we 
discover three main kinds of being in its development, to wit: somatic, anthropological, 
and theological being. !is succession of being’s uncovering is the main tendency of global 
world development.
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